A Suggestion on Suggestion by Friedman, Richard D. & Ceci, Stephen J.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2001
A Suggestion on Suggestion
Richard D. Friedman




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Friedman, Richard D. "A Suggestion on Suggestion." S. J. Ceci, co-author. Law Quad. Notes 44, no. 3 (2001): 100-8. (Adapted from
"The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications." S. J. Ceci, co-author. Cornell L. Rev. 86, no. 1 (2000):
33-108.)

In our lull Con~ell Law Review article, 
we summarize and analyze the principal 
findiilgs of psychological research 
concerning children's suggeslibility as well 
as other lactors that may affect the 
creclibiliiy of a child's allegation ol abuse. 
We demonstrate ihal what Lyon 
characterizes as a "new wave" of research is 
actually a broad and long-slanding 
scientific mainstream. We argue that  he 
resul~s of this research do, indeed, raise 
significant concerns lor  he real world of 
abuse and abuse invesiigation and ~ h u s  
engender signilicant legal implications. 
Par1 I of the lull article briefly describes 
[he history and current slate of research 
mto children's suggestibili~~ In this part, 
we argue thal, although psychological 
researchers disagree considerably over the 
degree to which  he suggestibility of young 
children may lead to false allega~ions of 
sexual abuse, there is an overwhelming 
consensus that children are suggestible to a 
degree that, we believe, must be regarded 
as significant. In presenting this argument, 
we respond to the contentions of 
revisionist scholars, particularly those 
recently expressed by Professor Lyon. We 
s1lo.c~ that there is good reason to believe 
the use of highly suggestive questions 
remains very common, and h a t  these 
questions present a significant possibility 
that children will make false allegations 
even 011 matters such as sexual abuse. 
Part I1 develops a framework, using 
Bayesian probability theory, for considering 
the findings described in Part I. We argue 
that there is meril to the traditional - and 
constitutionally compelled - ~ i e u ~  that an 
inaccurate criminal conviction is a far 
worse result than a failure to reach an 
accurate conviction, and that this 
perspective should inform the design of 
legal sys~ems. With this in mind, we 
explain thal even relatively slight 
probabililies of false allegations are 
polentially significanl. Moreover, we show 
thal the very substanlial probability that a 
child who has been abused will fail to 
reveal the abuse tends, perhaps counter- 
inluitively, to diminish the probative value 
ol an allegation of abuse when it is 
aclually made. 
I11  he discussion belom7, taken from Par1 
111 of the longer article, we turn 10 discussion 
ol the legal implications of our analysis. 
Sugges Live interview 
techniques 
Scientific research demonstrates that 
suggestive questions, including techniques 
such as coaching, bribes, and threats, 
increase the probability that the child will 
make an allegation of abuse regardless of 
whether it actually occurred. If in the end 
the child would make an allegation,  hen 
for two reasons it is preferable that this 
occur without suggesti~7e queslioning. First, 
an unprompted allegation is more 
powerful, persuasive evidence than a 
prompted allegation and therefore more 
likely to lead to a conviction if the 
defendant is in fact guilty For this reason, 
the self-interesc of the investigative and 
prosecutorial authorities should lead them 
to avoid suggestive questions when 
possible. Second, ii the child does make an 
unprompted allegation, it is unlikely to 
result in an inaccurate conviction, because 
in most circumstances children are very 
unlikely to make a false allegation without 
suggestive questionmg. 
It is preferable, therefore, to avoid 
suggestive questioning until the child has 
told all that she is likely to tell aithout 
suggestion. But for at least two reasons we 
do not believe that investigators should 
avoid suggestive questioning altogether. 
First, the information that they gain 
through sugestive questioning may be 
useful for purposes other than criminal 
prosecution - for example, the 
determination of custodj~ arrangements or 
the appropriateness of a restraining order. 
Because the governing standard of 
persuasion is lower in these settings than in 
criminal prosecutions, information 
obtained by suggestion is more likely to be 
decisive than in a ciiminal setting. Second, 
even in criminal prosecutions, an allegation 
procured by suggestive questioning ma): 
depending particularly on the stl-ength of 
the rest of the case, be decisive in carrying 
the prosecution's burden of persuasion. 
We recommend, therefore, that 
investigalors avoid suggestive queslions 
until they are confident that the child has 
told all she is likely to tell without 
pronlpting. Inteniewers should attempt to 
limit repetition of closed (i.e. yeslno) 
questions ~wtlzin the intenielv, and 
investigative authorities should, to [he 
exlent feasible, avoid nlultiple interviews 
\\ill1 mul~iple inteniebvers. Furthernlore, 
inleniewers should adopt categorical rules 
against the use of techniques that have 
been demonstrated to create particularly 
significant risks that a child will make a 
false allegation. Thus, interviewers should 
not offer rewards or other positive 
reinforcement for favored answers, lhreaten 
punishment or create negative 
reinforcement for disfavored ones, vilify the 
accused, or (unless the child has raised the 
matter first) refer to statements by the 
child's peers. Though suggestive questions 
are sometimes useful, the use of these 
techniques is always improper. 
There is nothing particularly novel 
about these recommendations. Although 
some interviewers may ignore them in 
practice, they are essentially textbook 
principles, much elabora~ed in manuals for 
inteniewers - including one by the 
National Center for the Prosecution of 
Child Abuse, in cooperation with llze 
National District Attorney's Association and 
the American Prosecutor's Research 
Institute. Interestingly, for all [hat Lyon and 
other child advocates contend that 
suggestive questioning is often necessary to 
prompt an accurate statement and that 
(nevertheless) troublesome questioning 
does not often occur in real practice, they 
do not argue anything differen~. They do 
not, for example, argue that investigators 
should feel free to ask suggestive questions 
without restraint. 
Witness taint and 
co~npe tence 
In State 11. Micizaels (612 A.2d 1372, 
1378 [N.J. 1994]), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that if the defendant 
presents "'some evidence' that the [child's] 
statements were the product of suggestive 
or coercive inteniew techniques," then the 
pi-osecution must demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence at a pretrial "taint 
hearing" that, "considering the ~otality of 
the circumstances surrounding the 
interviews, the statements or testimony [of 
the child] retain a degree of reliability 
sufficient to outweigh [he effects of the 
improper i n t e ~ ~ i e ~ v  techniques." If the 
proseculion lails to satisfy this burden, 
then the courl must esclude the child3 
testimon)! as well as her plior statements 
alleging abuse. 
Some courts outside New Jersey have 
occasionally folloa7ed A/liil~aels in requiring 
taint hearings. but more commonly courts 
simply consider these issues in determining 
the competency of the child to give 
testimony For our purposes, the difference 
is not particularly significant. Either way 
the bottom-line issue is whether the court 
should preclude the child from giving live 
testimony about the abuse because she has 
been subjected to a substantial degree of 
sugestion. 
Although Ceci coauthored the a~nicus 
brief that some have credited with 
persuading the hdichacls court, we agree in 
general with Lynn and John E.B. Myers that 
children's suggestibility should not usually 
prevent them from being heard as 
witnesses, even if the circumstances 
indicate that the child was subjected to 
strong forms of suggestion. We have two 
basic reasons for reaching this conclusion. 
First, a child's statement alleging abuse 
has significant value in prosing that abuse. 
Nothing we have said indicates the 
contrary Our arpment  supports the 
proposition that the suggestibility of the 
child ma! account for her allegation of 
abuse in some circumstances. The 
allegation itself is thus not conclusive 
evidence that abuse occurred. But the 
allegation may yet be important, even 
decisive elidence, at least when there is 
other evidence supporting it. In our longer 
article, we have argued that in some 
settings there is a greater than minuscule 
probability that the child would make the 
allegation even though it was false, and 
therefore the statement is not conclusive 
evidence, or nearly conclusive evidence, 
that the abuse occurred as described by the 
child. But we hare not argued that the 
statement should not alter a reasonable 
fact-finder's assessment of the probability of 
guilt. Plainly, i t  is often very significant 
evidence, even in the face of significant 
suggestion. 
Second, we believe that the dignity of 
the child is fostered by allowing her to tell 
her story first-hand in the proceeding that 
will resolve the truth of her allegation. 
Against these considerations, three basic 
arguments may be made for escluding the 
testimony of the child. We \\ill call these 
the reliability argument, the best e~ldence 
argument, and the ~vrongful conduct 
arLgumen t . 
1. According to the lrliabilitv argrmcnt, 
on ~vhich Micllacls principally depended, if 
the child has been subjected to significant 
suggestion, her testimony may be so 
unreliable that it should be rejected. We 
certainly agree that often the child's 
testimony may not be reliable in the sense 
of being virtually conclusive. Indeed, in 
some circumstances, the testimony may 
not even be reliable in the weaker sense 
that the denominator of the likelihood ratio 
- the probability that the child would 
testifj as she has even though the 
testimony is false - is very small. But 
notwithstanding some judicial statements 
to the contrary, reliability in neither sense 
is, or should be, the general standard for 
the admissibility of live testimony Rather, 
the governing principle is that, at least 
within broad bounds, the credibility of 
witnesses is for the jury to determine. 
In an earlier age, courts escluded the 
testimony of many potential witnesses, 
including the parties themselves, on the 
ground that bias or some other factor 
would make their testimony unreliable. 
The modem, vastly preferable view 
recognizes that such an exclusionary 
approach has huge costs in loss of valuable 
information. Cross-examination, 
impeachment, rebuttal, and re~o~gnition by 
the fact-finder of defects of the testimony 
- sometimes with the assistance of expert 
testimony - are the mechanisms that we 
hope will prevent the testimony from 
leading the fact-finder astray. Testimony of 
the parties is extremely unreliable, if for no 
reason other than self-interest, but it is 
universally allowed today. Indeed, a 
criminal defendant has a constitutional 
right to present his own testimony, even, in 
at least some circumstances, if it has been 
tainted by suggestion. In general, witnesses 
who claim firsthand knowledge do not 
have to pass through a reliability screen, 
e\ren when testifying against a criminal 
defendant. Witnesses with a grudge against 
the defendant, witnesses whose perception 
of the events at issue may have been 
impeded by stress, bad lighting, or weak 
eyesight, witnesses with faulty memory, 
and witnesses who have been offered some 
inducement (such as a reduction of 
sentence) to testify - all these are allowed 
to testify about what they assert they 
perceived, without the court first 
determining that their evidence is reliable. 
Courts should not ho1.d the testimony of 
children to a more stringent standard. 
A reliability standard for the admissibility 
of testimony misconceives the basic theory 
of evidence. To warrant admissibility, an 
individual item of evidence does not have 
to point reliably in the direction the 
proponent claims. "A brick is not a wall," 
and every witness need not hit a home nln,  
in the classic aphorisms. That is, a single 
piece of evidence including the testimony 
of a witness, does not have to support the 
prosecution's entire case but need only 
provide one of the building blocks for the 
case. Prosecution evidence, not reliable in 
itself because there is a substantial 
probability that it  would arise even i f  the 
defendant were innocent, may in 
conjunction with other evidence make an 
overwhelming case. 
The better standard is whether the 
prejudicial potential of the evidence 
outweighs the probative value. It must be 
constantly borne in mind that the child's 
testimony that abuse occurred does have 
substantial probative value. Even if the 
child was subjected to strong forms of 
suggestion, the child is significantly more 
likely to testify to a gven proposition if 
that proposition is true than if it is false, 
and no research suggests otherwise. In 
some cases, that probative value may be 
decisive. 
What then of prejudice? The principal 
prejudice concern is that the jury will 
overvalue the testimony by so much that 
the truth-determination process is 
benefited by exclusion. But to our 
knowledge, the scientific research provides 
no indication that juries are likely to 
overvalue the testimony of a child to this 
degree. It may well be that, especially 
absent explanation of the research on 
suggestibility, a jury would tend to 
underestimate the probability that the child 
would make the allegation if it was false 
(the denominator of the likelihood ratio). 
Such an error would tend to cause the jury 
to over-assess the probative value of the 
testimony. I t  is much more doubtful, 
however, that the jury would over-assess 
the probative value to such an extent that 
admission of the evidence is worse for the 
truth-determining process than denylng the 
jury access to this information. After all, 
jurors are capable of understanding the 
problem of suggestibility and taking it into 
account in assessing the testimony, and 
experimental evidence suggests that they 
do. Excluding the evidence, which has 
some probative value, guarantees that the 
jury will under-assess it.  Those who argue 
for this result, notwithstanding the usual 
rule that credibility is for the jury, should 
have the burden of demonstrating that the 
uncertain prospect of jury over-assessment 
is significant enough to warrant exclusion. 
5 w q  ~ t i v ~ ,  as we have pointed 
out, is in m e  mtamr- 
pdwtiveinthntit@eB.wes.tuherrhao 
in-, k!heugeM i n f o e m  yielded by 
k e  made akr ofhial suggesbns, 
c m m  have s p o h  of wrehbility of 
the que5tim. It al$o & the 
s r a m  less p e d ~ .  Momm, 
strong suggpti- opens the statements 
up to attack by d e h i e  experts and defense 
0-1. In this light, it is nat claw that the 
threat of ex(:Iusion d l ' a d d  very much 
incremental incentive to avoid undue 
suggestion. 
Furthermore, as we indicated in Part I, 
suggestive questioning has a proper role in 
investigations of child abuse, because in 
some settings it generates reports of abuse 
that openended questions @t not. 
Investigations aken lmk not only towards 
excLusion is appropriate in those contexts, I it is barer jus&ed by dze two other 
a ~ . e ~ - d ~ c u s s e d ~ b e 1 m .  
2. The best ~ d e n c e  argument does not 
rely on &e p m p ~ s i i i o ~ t  the evidence is 
mme prejndicial than probative. Rqher, it 
is b d  on the "best evideh" principk, 
the pwp&ri~n h a t  exdusiion oj - 
evidence is maranted in mme settings 
I bemuse it may induce the creation of beuq criminal pmseonb ,  but towards civil 
pmceedingi aimed at protecting h e  child 
and others. It may be unfair to the I 
I agents akoc-kated with the pm&cution - interviewer, d in any event it will likely 
1 &gularly conduct intenria& of children chill her investigation, if she is p~ on a 
tightrope - one step too passive, and she 1 I with & amkipation that prosecutors d I use them in abuse uws, the threat of may miss a trurhhl ~ & r t  of abuse; one 
step too agpsive, and the cdurt will 
exclude the child5 testimony 
A best evidence d e ,  using the harsh 
sanction of exclusion of evidene, depends 
on predictability3 which quires that a rule 
operate in a crisp, bqht4ne manner. We 
ha* argued that categorical mles are 
possible with respect to ploys, such as 
bribes, threats, ridicule, and peer pressure, 
that memh has shown to cmte 
particularly significant risks of hlse 
allegati~m. Generally, however, delicate, 
fact-based judgments are more appmpriate 
in this area dun bright-line rules. 
Interviewers must take the ci~unsmnces 
pf the particular case into account in 
deciding the degree of suggestiveness 
appmp'riate u any given point in a given 
intervi'ew The interviewer m t  balance the 
risk of !&ng information by remaining too 
open-esded against the risk of producing 
false i n e a t i o n  by being too suggestive. 
I 
I exclusion of the child4; testimony for 
undue suggestiveness may-inhibit them 
fr&n behg so suggestive. We believe that 
this factor, m&er than cancans about 
t r u s d i n m ,  underlies tihe dactrine - 
invoked often bat rarely with success - 
that in-court eyewitness identification 
tieswony may be so taihted by prior 
suggestiveness as to be constinx~ody 
im-fble. I' 
This consideration plays a significant 
role in tZle realm of child witnesses. 
Neverthelm, @yen the afiirmative 
cCtmddmtio~ wei- in favor of 
admisddiq we da not believe it umdy 
suffices tcr jlrls* lexclusim of t h ~  child's 
teswq. 
For~me &ng; many probioml 
~temiemm, even hose inched to assist 
the prnsec~tion;~ may already have 
camfderable e i t j . ~  not to cmduet 
intervim in an unduly mggwtive darner. 
In shan, the best e- a q g x k t  
may wmt d u & g  the ddas 
tes-any in extmie mes,  in which my 
msomble iinterui-r should h o w  that 
her questtimi@ w& unduly mggdve. We 
b&m, h m w I  fhat it would be cki&ult. 
or i3~gmssib1e to make the courth decisions 
both p h b l l e  rmd-sensible if they 
exclude tk'child5 testimony in less 
m r n e  cases. 
3. The wmn@ conduce a p m t  
cantends that the prosecution should not 
benefit from evidence that it or those 
associated with it s e a m  by acting in a 
reprehensible way It &us aesembk the 
argument made by JuE;tie_ H o b  .ad 
others in suppon of the &'u&xmy rule 
for evidence secured xtatm-zid 
search, that it is less &&.&at wqe 
Strong suggesivenes~~ as we have 
pointed out, is in some . 
in tbat B reducets, mtbu tban r 
incream) the useful informatio~ 
yielded by the pestion. It also 
makes the child's staIemmts less 
up to alack by defense q e r t s '  
and defense coumel, 
ir4mxhmIs sh@ &pap 
3 a=&\- Tf!&E!&ofw~~b - te@m~n:g~%~t. d~aatmm&Wm' 
f k @ e e d q i f a r s l a e ? S q r b d t m m o *  ' 
il%mi-, eMm rnmw"y-m. 
In sum, the arguments for exclusion 06 
the childk testimony have s u b s ~ t i a l  
weight only in extreme ad, a 4  wen 
then only the best eviden? and wrongful 
condudt arguments carry significanr&rce. 
The reliability argument, the one 
principally emphasized by Michaels, is 
unpersuasive. Thus, in extreme a e s ,  
when the inte~ewmg technique violates 
clearly established norms or amounts to an 
intentional or reckless usurpation of the 
childk memory - and Mirhaek appears to 
have been such a case - exclusion is 
justifiable. In other cases, it is not. 
Hearsay , 
Often the child makes an allegaticm 
before trial, but does not ~estlfy at all at 
trial or does not testify to rhe full substance 
of the earlier allegation. If the prosecutor 
offers the prior statement into evidence the 
defendant will likely object that it is barred 
by the rule against hearsay and by his right , 
under the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution to "be confronted with @e 
witnesses against him." 
In recent years, most jurisdictions have 
relaxed the application of the hearsay rule 
so far as it would exclude out-of-court 
statements by children that allege abuse 
and are offered to prove the abuse. Some 
courts have accomplished this end by 
stretching the limitations on the hearsay 
exceptions for excited utterances and for 
statements made for medical diagnmis or 
treatment. Others have invoked the 
residual ortUcat.ch-alln exception to the 
hearsay rule now expressed in Federal Rule 
of Evidence 807. Also, some states have 
adopted hearsay exceptions specifically 
tailored for children of "tender years." 
Because the Supreme Court has, LO a hrge 
extent, conformed the confrontaition right 
to the prevailing law of hearsay, tbk 
Confrontation Clause as now cmmmed 
poses only a slight addzt id  barrier to 
- 
sight protect ''sindm v@m," tm& &e ' , . . 
pri1wip1-plue pe@ b da6 ahad rm . . 
weed out hamliable hemday qx&kmce b 5  
the reliable. Accoltby up tb C6wt. h PC 
confmlil'ta~01 @t is 'pk&nady a 
f u n c t i ~ Z  right h t T m o k s  mbb$ky $I 
criminsl Thus, jurisdictions taw a 
receptive attitude tcqm& hearsay , 
statements by children aUcghg abuse , 
against hem have done so on the grpwnds 
that the stdlt~ments am wliahk. Indx 1- 
of a statement made by s very yowlrg Mdi 
, two f a n ~ s  have baespaddarly 
influential - &rst, thc apparent absence 06 
a motive far the cMd to lie and, cond, 7 the apparent unlikelihood in sape s e d g s  
that the child could develop a plan KO 1 1  
dedeive or tc~ cm&et her account if it (+d 
not in fact reflect abuse she had m c d y  
sukred, i 
The scientific r-h, however, 
indicates. that in some cimmstmces 
childrenb s ta t t$ ik  a= not parriculasly 
reliable. C o m p d  to gkner~1 hearsay, a 
statement made by a child who has been 
subjected to strong hrms-d suggestion 
may be notably unrebble, The apparent 
ab-ce of a motive to lie Ss d significance 
only to the extent the defendant, in 
attempting to reconcile the fact that the 
child made the statement with his theory 
that the statemgnt is false, contends bat 
the child lied. The defendant may, 
however, contend principally not that the 
chld lied huct that suggestive questianing 
led her to believe honmtly h t  Ehe 
assertion was tmihhtl. Also, sugge~tive 
questioning may make it far mme plausible 
that the child would state a &e account of 
abuse that one would m t  a t h e m e  m p ~ t  
from a young child who was not abused. 
Far obvious ethical reasons, resea-s 
have letrained from trying to hmlcam false 
memories of abuse; however, there is . 
ample anecdatal evidence that field 
inte~ewers ometimes ply child yvitnmes 
with infamution that could lbe e o m ~ ~ ~ d  
as indicative of s a d  abuse. Same of thi~ 
hfomtion, if later incorpomted into the 
childk & c l 0 6 ~ ~ ,  would be &dmd 
outside her OT:&T~ redm df kowlec@~ 
and so viewed by f~ t -hders  as a stlrmgl. 
indicatjon that abuse ocmmd. ' I 
We emphasize two points. First, we are 
not arguing that all children's statements 
;Ire unreliable. How reliable a statement is 
depends on all the circumstances, 
including - as we have suggested above 
and throughout our longer article - the 
nature of the interviewing process to which 
the child has been subjected. For example, 
sometimes a child, without any prompting, 
articulates a detailed and plausible account 
of abuse soon after the alleged event and, 
still without prompting, consistently 
~tdheres to that account. In such a 
situation, the child's statement may be 
very reliable. 
Second, even if the statement appears 
unreliable, that does not necessarily mean 
that a court should exclude it under an 
ideal doctrine of hearsay and confrontation. 
Friedman has argued for some years that 
the law of hearsay and confrontation is in a 
most unsatisfactory state. The chief errors, 
in his view. lie in conforming the 
confrontation right to the law of hearsay 
and in perceiving both as based principally 
on the need to impro~~e the reliability of 
evidence. This conjunction results both in 
hearsay law that is often overly restrictive 
and in a confrontation right that is 
insufficiently protective of defendants. We 
do not attempt to develop this argument in 
full here. But a system that, according to 
Friedman, would be far superior to the 
present one could admit many hearsay 
statements by children without making the 
admissibility decision depend on a 
determination of reliability. 
Expert] evidence 
Traditionally, courts have been loath to 
allow expert witnesses to testify about 
factors affecting the credibility of percipient 
witnesses. Courts were afraid that ehFerts 
would usurp one of the central functions of 
the jury, to evaluate the credibility of 
uqtnesses. In recent decades, ho~vever, 
courts have been more willing to allow 
experts to testify about factors that might 
affect rhe credibility of a witness in a gven 
s~tuation and that might othentise be 
insufficiently understood by a jury In 
criminal cases, either the prosecution or 
the defense may urge the need for espert 
testimony. For example, a defendant may 
Introduce expert testimony on the 
\ulnerabilities of eyewitness testimony A 
prosecutor might introduce espert 
'estimony concerning rape trauma 
yndrotne to help explain the complainant's 
delay in making her allegation of rape. 
Similarly, in child sexual abuse cases, 
prosecutors often offer, and courts often 
admit, expert evidence to bolster the 
complainant's credibility. As Myers has 
stated, "Courts permit expert testimony 
[among other reasons] to explain why 
sexually abused children delay reporting 
abuse, why children recant, why children's 
descriptions of abuse are sometimes 
inconsistent, why some abused children are 
angry, why some children want to live with 
the person who abused them, why a victim 
might appear 'emotionally flat' following 
the assault, [and] why a child might run 
away from home. . . ." 
Myers endorses the use of such 
testimony, which often fits within the 
rubric of child abuse accommodation 
syndrome, on the ground that "[tlo the 
untutored eye of a juror, such behavior 
may seem incompatible with allegations of 
sexual abuse." U1e agree that such 
testimony on behalf of the prosecution is 
proper at least after the defendant attacks 
the child's credibility - and sometimes 
even before, if the grounds on which the 
jun  might doubt her credibility are 
already apparent. 
Often, ho\irever, it is the defense in child 
sesual abuse cases that nishes to introduce 
credibility-related esTert testimony usually 
to show that the child's statements may 
have resulted from suggesti~~e questioning. 
Many courts have admitted such testimony 
but some courts still esclude it or confine it 
rather narron7l>: Lyon, while not expressing 
any opinion on the frequent use by 
prosecutors of expert testimony to bolster a 
child's credibility once it has been attacked, 
espresses doubt about the need for defense 
espert testimony on suggestibility. 
We believe that if evidence supports the 
conclusion that an inteniewer subjected 
the child to a given set of suggestive 
influences, then the court should allonr the 
defense to present the testimony of a \veil- 
qualified esFert as to the plausible effects 
of those influences. 
The research on suggestibility discussed 
in this article gii\.es an expert ample basis 
on which to esyress an opinion that should 
easily satisfy the "gatekeeping" scrutiny of 
the trial court as outlined by Dnu27ct-t I! 
Afc17-c11 DOMI ?)h(71771~~~l l t i~d~ 117 . (509 U.S. 
579, 597 [1993]). Indeed, if the "general 
acceptance" test of I! Lhlitcd Stntcs 
(293 E 1013, 1014 [D.C. Cir. 1923]), 
which still prevails in some states, is 
sensibly applied, such espert opinion 
should easily satisb that test as well. As 
Part I of our F-111 article shows. this research 
has used the scientific method of testing, 
has been extensi\rely subjected to the rigors 
of publication and review, and has gained 
broad acceptance in the scientific 
community. Naturally as in any area of the 
social sciences (and some of the hard 
sciences as well), there is not unanimity on 
all significant points, and on some points 
there is a range of interpretations. But a 
court should not exclude testimony by a 
qualified e,\pert reflecting an opinion held 
by a clear majority, or even by substantial 
proportion, of professionals in the field 
simply because others hold divergent 
~ iews .  If that were the standard for 
exclusion, fact-finders \vould virtually 
never have the benefit of the experts' 
knowledge. Thus, we find unpersuasive the 
rather mysterious opinion of the Eighth 
Circuit in Unitcd States I: Rotlsc (1 11 E3d 
561 [sth Cir. 19971). which held that the 
trial court had acted within its discretion in 
allowing the defense expert to testify on the 
basis of his own research, but not on the 
basis of the research of others. 
The question remains whether, and 
when, an expert's opinion may assist the 
jury sufficiently to warrant admissibility 
Ultimately, this question depends on an 
assessment of the probative value and 
prejudice of the espert evidence. Lyon 
contends that ':jurors likely already knon-" 
that "children are suggestible." This 
argument may seem odd, coming near the 
end of a long article contending that 
children are not as sugqestible as some 
interpretations of the research indicate. But 
Lyons point seems to be that, while 
children are indeed suggestible to some 
degree, jurors do not need e\Fert advice to 
tell them that, and such ad\ice may in fact 
cause jurors to overestimate substantially 
the degree of suggestibility. Myers makes a 
similar point. saying that "some adults" 
think children are more suggestible than 
they actually are. 
One can easily accept the proposition 
- ~vhich Lyon supports with survey 
evidence - that many even most, 
potential jurors understand that children 
are inore suggestible than adults, and yet 
recocgni=e the value of esFert evidence. Two 
points are fairly obvious. First, the same 
surveys reveal that a substantial number of 
jurors probably do not recoLgnize this 
suggestibility differential. Second, 
recognizing that children are suggestible, or 
more suggestible than adults, says little 
about magnitude - how suggestible they 
are. Perhaps more fundamentally, our full 
article shows that the suggestibility of 
children is not a one-dimensional matter 
that can be summarized adequately by 
saying that children are [pick your 
adjective] suggestible. How plausibly a 
gven child might have alleged abuse even 
if the abuse did not occur depends on the 
particular situation, including the extent 
and nature of the suggestive influences to 
which the child was subjected. There is no 
reason to assume that the average potential 
juror, much less the overwhelming 
majority of jurors, has a good 
understanding of all the insights that 
decades of psychologcal research have 
ylelded. For example, research shows that 
repeated questions may have a pronounced 
effect on a child, and that children 
subjected to suggestive questioning rather 
frequently make false statements about 
physical events that would be of central 
concern to them. 
Furthermore, there is little reason to 
assume that expert evidence on this subject 
\ d l  be unduly prejudicial. There is no 
plausible basis for believing that allowing 
the defense to present expert testimony will 
bias the jury in favor of the defendant, in 
the sense of malung the jury impose an 
inappropriately high standard of persuasion 
on the prosecution. The danger to which 
Lyon seems to be pointing is the possibility 
that the jury will give excessive weight to 
the e'xpert's testimony of suggestiveness. 
But there appears to be no sound basis for 
concluding that this danger is real - and 
that the jury will not only overvalue the 
expert's testimony but will do it so much 
that the testimony will be substantially 
more prejudicial than probative. Junes 
have convicted defendants in many cases 
in the face of expert testimony on 
suggestibility presented by the defense. 
In assessing the danger of overvaluation, 
it is important to bear in mind a major 
theme stressed both Lyon and by us: the 
degree of a child's testimony is extremely 
dependent on the particular circumstances 
of the case. Thus, if the defense expert is 
performing her function properly, she will 
testify only to suggestive influences that the 
jury could reasonably conclude, on the 
basis of all the circumstances, were present 
in the case. For example, if there is no 
basis for concluding that the child was 
threatened with negative consequences for 
failure to describe abuse, then research on 
the effects of such threats would be 
irrelevant to the case and should not be 
included in the expert's testimony. If the 
defense expert does not exercise self- 
restraint, the court can ensure that her 
testimony does not stray beyond the case 
at hand. 
And, of course, the prosecution is not 
toothless. The prosecutor may cross- 
examine the defense e-pert. In doing so, 
the prosecutor should attempt to expose 
any over-generalizations that the expert has 
made or any dubious assumptions on 
which the materiality of her evidence 
depends. Moreover, as stated previously, if 
the defense impeaches the child's 
testimony, whether by exlpert testimony or 
otherwise, the court should allow the 
prosecution to present its own expert 
testimony supporting the child's credibility. 
Likewise, this testimony should be limited 
to the issues made material by the setting 
of the case - specifically, to the grounds 
raised explicitly or implicitly by the defense 
for being skeptical of the child, or to those 
that would likely appear plausible to the 
jury even absent the defense's contention. 
In short, the adversarial system, through 
the use of cross-examination and rebuttal 
witnesses, is resilient and can adequately 
expose the weaknesses of expert opinions 
offered by either side. 
There does not seem to be any 
substantial reason to assume that jurors 
will tend systematically to overvalue 
defense expert evidence significantly but 
undervalue prosecution ezrpert evidence - 
and to do so by enough to warrant 
exclusion. Some jurors may be confused by 
the "battle of the experts," of course, and 
some might unthinkingly treat conflicting 
expert evidence as a wash, which they can 
safely ignore. But these are always potential 
problems when expert witnesses contest 
each other, whatever the subject. Such 
problems do not justify insisting that the 
fact-finder make decisions of enormous 
importance on the basis of intuition. 
uninformed by the insights that decades of 
scientific research have to offer. 
Videotaping interviews 
The issue of videotaping interviews cvith 
a child witness has generated much 
discussion. Myers has ably summarized 
many of the factors for and against 
videotaping. On the positive side of the , 
ledger, Myers notes that videotaping gives 
an inteniewer incentive to use proper 
techniques and preserves a record of such 
use. Perhaps because he is writing from the 
vantage point of the inteniewer, Myers 
does not mention another equally 
important argument: if the intendewer does 
use suggestive techniques, the videotape 
will reveal it. We have emphasized that the 
degree to which a child's sugqestibility 
accounts for her allegation of abuse 
depends very largely on the extent and 
nature of the sucggestive influences to 
which she has been subjected. If all 
inteniews with the child are videotaped, it 
will substantially reduce, and in some cases 
effectively eliminate, uncertainty on this 
score. An inteniewer's notes are an 
unsatisfactory alternative; if historical 
accuracy is the goal, there is no substitute 
for electronically recording inteniews. 
Of course, informal communications 
with the child, such as by her parents or 
teachers, will not ordinarily be videotaped. 
These informal communications are often 
significant sources of suggestion. Similarly, 
though it might be feasible for a therapist 
to tape sessions with a child if there is 
suspicion of abuse, taping therapy sessions 
as a matter of course would probably be 
inappropriate. Moreover, even if therapy 
sessions could be appropriately recorded, 
the patient-psychotherapist relationship is 
privileged, which would probably preclude 
evidentiary use of the tape. Thus, in many 
cases, a practice of videotaping 
investigative interviews does not expose all 
serious possibilities of suggestiveness. But 
the intractability of some aspects of the 
problem is a weak argument against 
mitigating the problem where that is 
possible. Videotaping considerably narrows 
the problem of determining the extent of 
suggestive influences to which the child is 
subjected, and that is a great benefit. 
The arguments on the other side of the 
ledger are, once again, based in large part 
on the fear that the jury will overvalue the 
evidence in favor of the defense. And once 
again, we believe that keeping potentially 
useful information away from the jury is an 
inappropriate means of ensuring that the 
jurors will not place too much weight on i t .  
The prosecution has ample opportunity, 
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importance of the excerpts used by the 
other side. The court has authority to 
restrain the parties if the p r o m  consumes 
too much trial time in relation to the 
probative value of the evidence. 
Thus, in accord with most professionals 
in this field, we believe that it is good 
practice for official interviewexs to 
videotape interviews conducted with 
cMdren during an investigation or 
prosecution of suspected child abuse. 
~oreover, we belike that, absent exigent 
circumstances, interviewers should be 
required as a matter of law to tape such 
interviews. This is the standard practice in 
many jurisdictions, and there is no reason 
why it should not be made mandatory 
In jurisdictions where taping is not 
required as a matter of law, courts may 
nevertheless craft evidentiary rules based 
on a "best evidence" principle that give 
interviewers strong incentives to follow the 
practice. The most stringent of these rules 
would exclude the child's statements, or 
even her testimony, if the interviews were 
not taped (again, and throughout this 
discussion, absent exigent circumstances). 
ThLsale, although harsh on its face, 
would quickly amount in effect merely to 
an almost absolute requirement of taping. 
Officials would quickly learn that it is 
easier to tape than to invite exclusion of 
evidence, and as a result, very little 
evidence would actually be excluded. A 
somewhat softer rule, followed by some 
courts, makes the fdure to videotape the 
interview a significant factor in determining 
admissibility of the_ chdd's statements or 
testimony Other variations would seek to 
impose the costs of failure to videotape the 
i n t e ~ e w  on the prosecution, but without 
relying on exclusion. Thus, giym the 
failure to record, a defense expert could be 
allowed to testifj as to the potential effect 
of all suggestive influences to whch the 
child may have been subjected. The court 
might also instruct the jury that the 'I 
- 
interviewer failed to follow proper practice 
and that the jury should take the failurn 
into account in evaluating the possibility 
that the chdd's statement or testimony was 
the product of suggestion. 
Guidance and control 
Finally, we come to the end of a trial. 
Judges in criminal cases in federal court, 
and in some other jurisdictions, are free to 
comment to the jury on the weight of the 
evidence, including factors bearing on the 
credibility of witnesses. Thus, if a witness is 
a drug or alcohol abuser, or a former 
accomplice of the defendant, or if she has 
received or hopes to receive favorable 
treatment in return for her testimony, the 
judge may comment on how these factors 
affect her credibility Similarly, judges often 
comment generally about the factors that 
are believed to affect the credibility of 
eyewitnesses. 
Suppose, then, that a chlld testifies or 
makes an admissible out-of-court statement 
alleging abuse, and evidence supports the 
conclusions that she was previously 
subjected to highly suggestive influence 
The question arises whether the judge 
should comment on these influences as 
potentially affecting her credibility In most 
Continued on page 108 
The question remains wbetber, and 
wben, an expert's opinion may assist 
tbe jury suflciently to wawant 
admissibility. Ultimately, tbis question 
depends on an assessment oftbe 
probative value and prejudice of tbe 
expert evidence. Lyon contends tbat 
cases. we do not believe that any judicial 
comment - either supporting or adverse 
to the child$ credibility - is necessary. 
ire believe it usually suffices if the court 
affords the parties adequate opportunity to 
present expert evidence on the likely 
impact of these influences. In an egregous 
case involving highly sugqestive influences, 
some judicial comment might be 
appropriate. 
Along with the power to comment on 
the credibility of witnesses, a trial court 
also has the authority in a criminal case to 
refuse to enter judLgment on a ierdict of 
guilt, and to remit the prosecution to a new 
trial, if it is persuaded that the verdict is 
contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence. In making this determination. 
the court is free to consider the credibility 
of witnesses. Therefore, an accused might 
argue that a child's statement or testimony 
is SO tainted by suggestion that a verdict of 
guilty cannot stand. We believe that this 
argument should usually but not allvays, fail. 
Suppose that the case is marked by two 
factors. First, apart from the child's 
testimony or prior statements, the 
prosecution has insubstantial evidence as 
to at least one element of the charge, 
mostly likely to the fact of abuse. Second, 
the child was subjected to highly 
su~es t i ve  influences. As Part I1 of our full 
article shows, the first factor means that the 
prosecution must rely heady on the child's 
allegation. Indeed, the allegation must 
c a m  the prosecution's case the very large 
distance from the presumption of 
innocence to the constitutionally mandated 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. And the court might conclude, on 
the basis of the second factor, that the 
probability that the child would make the 
allegation even though it is false cannot 
reasonably be perceived as minuscule. 
Putting these two considerations together, 
the court might well conclude that a jury 
could not reasonably find that the 
prosecution satisfied its standard of 
persuasion. 
If prosecutors select cases appropriately, 
cases with both these features will be rare. 
The judicial power to reject a verdict, even 
if usually kept in resenre, can be a 
powerful force ensuring that the 
prosecutors do indeed make careful 
selections. 
Conclusion 
Research on the suggestibility 
children reveals that the degree to wnicn 
children are suggestible depends to a large 
extent on how investigators conduct 
inteniews. It also indicates that abuse 
investigations are often conducted in such 
a way as to enhance the dangers of 
suggestibility. We have presented a set of 
policy recommendations that we belie1.e 
are consonant with those findings. These 
recommendations are, we believe, ellen- 
handed, reflecting a bias for neither the 
prosecution nor the defense. The proof of 
our even-handedness may be that we have 
exposed ourselves to a two- flank attack. 
Prosecutors may complain about our 
recommendations that in some circumstances 
children's statements regarding abuse 
should be regarded as unreliable for 
hearsay purposes, that courts should often 
be receptive to expert evidence 
emphasizing the suggestibility of children, 
that videotaping of inteniews should be 
mandatory. and that occasionally the 
weakness of a child's statement or 
testimony should cause the court to refuse 
to enter a judgment of guilt. Defense 
lawyers, on the other hand, are likely to 
complain about our recommendation that, 
in all but egregious cases, the child should 
not be rendered incompetent to testify 
because she was esposed to strongly 
suggestive inteniewing techniques. 
We suspect that scholars who have 
recently challenged the legal significance of 
the psychologcal research emphasizing 
children's suggestibility are not motivated 
principally by antipathy to policy proposals 
such as the ones we have presented. Rather, 
we suspect that they are concerned about a 
matter of mood. In an earlier day, children's 
statements were often not taken seriously As a 
result, child sexual abuse was under-reported 
and under-prosecuted. Thus, there is a 
concern that scientific research emphasizing 
that chlldren are suggestible will be taken for 
more than it is worth and lead us back to 
penlasive and unwarranted devaluation of 
children's statements and testimony 
We recognize this concern. But we balk 
at any approach that makes it more difficult 
to recognize, and thus mitigate, problems in 
the lvay children allegng abuse are 
inteniewed. And we confess that we do have 
a bias of an intellectual sort, which underlies 
our predilection in favor of allowing both the 
child and experts to testify Accurate fact- 
finding, we believe, is not best achieved by 
trylng to maintain and regulate the fact- 
finders' ignorance. The best cure for possible 
misunderstanding is not to keep an area in 
darkness, but rather to bathe it in light. 
Richard D. Friedman canted 'I B.A. and aJ .D.  
f'ivni Hanjar-cl and a D.Pltil. in modc1.n histo??l.fi.o?ll 
Osford Uni\lcr-sit!! His ~rscai-chJoc~tscs p~incipal l~ 
on c\,idcncc and L1.S. S t c p ~ m c  Court llistor?. Hc is 
thc gcncinl cditor elf The Ne~v Mligmore. a multi- 
volume tl-catisc on cvidcncc. ~111d h a s  l?c~rt 
dcsignatcd to w i t c  the ~jol~cnic on the Hughes Court 
in thc Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Histor). of 
the United States Supreme Court. Plqfcssol- 
Friedman clcrl:cd-f(li.J~td~g~* Inling R. Kat!fn~an ;)f' 
the U.S. Court q f  Aplqcalsfi1- thc Sciond Cil-suit. 
He \vnc thcn an associatc/ot- tht- la\vJirnt o f  Pattl, 
CT'Eiss, R~fi ind,  \A'ltnr-ton l+ Ganison in N c ~ v  lbrl: 
Citv Hc cantc to thc Laiv School as a visiting 
professor in 1987.fron1 Cardozo Laiv School and 
joined thcJaculty in 1988. Pvqfcssol- Friedman is 
thc Ralph \A! Aiglcr P,qfcssor q f  Ln~v. 
Stephen J.  Ceci, PIt.D., holdc a l~fctimc c.nclol\lcd 
chair in dcvclc7prncntal psycholo~\~ at Coincll 
L~ni~ lcrs i t~  He is the cllctltor q f  appro.~imatcl!~ 300 
articles, books, and ci~apters, and hc hnc @1~c11 
hundrcck q f  invited addrrsscs arc~und the ~vo~.ld. 
C C C ~ ?  ho11ors and scicntlfic fl\~~al.ds illc~~cdc a Scliioi- 
Fulbridit-Hays Fcllo~vship and an NIH Rcscat-ch 
Carco. Scientist Aivald, thc IBM Supcr.conilxctinq 
Plizc, t h ~ c  Scnioi- A4cnsa Fo~cndation Reseal-ch 
Prizes, and the Arthur- Ricl:tcl- A\\lald.for his \\lnr-1: 
~711 childan? testimony He c ~ i ~ ~ c n t l v  S C I T ~ C S  on S C I ~ C I I  
cditorial bonds. The Antetican Board of Forensic 
Psycholog gavc Ccci its Lffctimc Distingcishcd 
Contlil?utioiz A\z~aldJor 2000, and tltc Ainc~ican 
Psychologcal Association anno~inccd he is the 
1-ccipicnt qf its 2002 L~fetimc Distiitguishcd 
Contlihution Award.for Scicncc and Society. Ccci is 
aJcl lo~l  qfscvcn dfffcrcnt di~fisions q f  thc Antc~i ian 
Psychologcal Association, m well ~ r c  aJello~v q f  tlic 
Antclican Association of Applied and Pi-cvcntivc 
Psscltoloqy British Psvcholc~ical Society, and the 
Amclican Psychological Socit-ty. His book (so-lvlittcn 
wit11 M a c g c  Brzcch) Jeopardy in the Courtroom: 
A Scientific Analysis of Children's Testimony 
(1 995) is an American Psycliologicnl Association 
(APS) bestsellel; and winner of the 2000 William 
James AivardJor E~ccllcnce in Psvcholc7g. Hc is /?as1 
pwsidcrzt q f  thc Division o f  General Psycholog: and 
a nlcml7cr qf thc Adviso~?l Board to lhc National 
Scicncc Foundation5 Directol-atc-for Social. 
Behaviol-al, and Economic Scicnccs. Ccci is a n ~ c i n l ~ c ~ '  
o f  thc National Acadcin~l qf Scicnccs Comri1ittt-c on 
Behavioral, Co,qniti~le. and Scnco~?] Siicnccs, and a 
f01711cr n1embcr (I/  thc Board of Directors of APS. 
Ceci is thefoundcr and cditc~r- elf the new ~ ~ S j o u r n a l  
Psychologcal Science in the Public Interes~, which 
is ~arti~crccl with Scientific American. 
